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The rate of obsolescence of a sign seems to be nearer to that of an
automobile than that of a building.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, buildings were
often heavily laden with storefront signs. 2 With the 1869 "devel-
opment of 'hoardings,' or leased bill-posting walls," tiered displays
of billboards emerged, which in turn came to be a source of legal
battles over off-site general advertising signs.3 Hoardings two- or
three-levels high often encased sides, or even whole buildings, in
* Associate, Reuben & Junius LLP, San Francisco, California. Bachelor of Arts,
Brown University (1997); Master in City Planning, University of California, Berkeley
(2006); Juris Doctor, University of California, Hastings College of Law (2006). Mr. Miller is
a land use and environmental attorney that regularly advises clients on historic preserva-
tion issues. Beginning in Fall, 2011, Mr. Miller will be Associate Professor of Law, Universi-
ty of Idaho College of Law.
1. ROBERT VENTURI ET AL., LEARNING FROM LAS VEGAS: THE FORGOTTEN SYMBOLISM
OF ARCHITECTURAL FORM 34 (2000) (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1977).
2. Diane Burant, Building Signs: A History That Defines Their Historical Signifi-
cance In the Commercial Streetscape, 1900-1940, 18 (Jan. 1993) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Ball State University) (on file with the Ball State University Library).
3. George H. Kramer, Preserving Historic Signs in the Commercial Landscape: The
Impact of Regulation 9-10 (Dec. 1989) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Oregon) (on
file with the University of Oregon Library).
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billboards.4 The fight against billboards came to define how cities
thought about signs, and early twentieth century City Beautiful
programs typically sought to reduce or eliminate billboard adver-
tisements.6 Over the last century, such sign reduction regulations
have garnered increasing citizen and legal support.
In the past half-century, however, historic preservation has al-
so emerged as a force in defining the contours of the city. In that
time, the scope of historic preservation has grown, and continues
to grow remarkably. What was once a movement concerned pri-
marily with landmarks and architecture has come to embrace a
whole new scope of histories, including ordinary ephemera such as
business signs. Once anathema, the preservation of business signs
no longer in operation is now increasingly the subject of preserva-
tion advocates who are seeking to preserve a broader sense of a
community's past.
The growth of historic preservation to include more ephemeral
aspects of the built environment brings with it new legal ques-
tions. These efforts to retain historic signs are of particular inter-
est because signage is never merely an aesthetic creature. Its pur-
pose, from its origin, is to communicate a message, regardless of
whether that is to propose a business transaction or to communi-
cate a political or ideological message. The ability to reuse a sign
for a different use is not as evident as with a building, as a build-
ing can often change its use without substantial alterations.
The National Park Service has consistently waffled on the
question of signage. On the one hand, it has argued that historic
signs6 should be removed in order to highlight the architectural
merit of buildings and to preserve the character of historic dis-
tricts.7 At the same time, the National Park Service has also em-
braced the retention of some signage as part of a broader definition
of historic preservation that goes beyond mere landmarks and ar-
chitectural significance.8 In a technical preservation brief dedicat-
ed to historic signs, the National Park Service notes that:
4. Id.
5. Id. at 12-13.
6. The term "historic sign" is used in this Article to designate signs listed on the Na-
tional Register, as well as signs that may be eligible for, but which have not officially been
listed on, the National Register.
7. H. WARD JANDL, NATL PARKS SERV., PRESERVATION BRIEF 11, REHABILITATING
HISTORIC STOREFRONTS, available at http://www.nps.gov/history/HPS/tps/briefs/briefl1.htm
("Removal of some signs can have a dramatic effect in improving the visual appearance of a
building.").
8. MICHAEL J. AUER, NATL PARKS SERV., PRESERVATION BRIEF 25, THE




Historic signs once allowed buyers and sellers to communi-
cate quickly, using images that were the medium of daily
life. Surviving historic signs have not lost their ability to
speak. But their message has changed. By communicating
names, addresses, prices, products, images, and other
fragments of daily life, they also bring the past to life.9
But the preservation of a sign, especially a historic business
sign, presents unique problems for modern-day retailers. For busi-
nesses, especially retail operations, an on-site sign indicating the
service or goods sold is an important part of attracting customers.
A study by the U.S. Small Business Administration notes six pri-
mary functions for signs:
1. To develop brand equity[;] . . .. 2. To aid recall and rein-
forcement of other media advertising[;] . . . . 3. To prompt
"impulse" purchases[;] . . . . 4. To change a purchasing deci-
sion once [a] customer is [on-site][;] . . . . 5. To promote traf-
fic safety by notifying motorists where they are in relation
to where they want to go, and assisting their entry to the
premises should they decide to stop. . . . [; and] 6. To com-
plement community aesthetic standards. 0
Local retailers are especially beholden to signs, as these are the
least-expensive means of advertising by several factors." "[Q]uick-
service" restaurants receive as much as 35% of their business from
consumers who saw a sign,12 while industry studies suggest that
informational outdoor signage increases business an average of
15%.13 Factors such as these make on-site business signs an im-
portant part of any business's message to consumers. Thus, signs
that reference prior, no longer relevant uses can be challenging for
some businesses.
Among these challenges is the fact that historic business signs
typically advertised specific products, or even specific brands of
products. These products may include those towards which societal
norms have changed over time, such as cigarettes. For instance,
imagine a children's clothing boutique that rents a commercial
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. R. James Claus & Susan L. Claus, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., SIGNS: SHOWCASING
YouR BUSINESS ON THE STREET (2001), available at http://www.comptonduling.com/
images/pdfs/SBA%201mportance%200f%2OSigns.pdf.
11. Id. (noting advertising cost per thousand impressions as $0.22 for an on-premise
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storefront beneath a large, elegant sign that reads "liquor" and
"cigarettes." Alternatively, imagine a used car dealership that
takes over a diner with a large sign that reads "Johnie's Broiler:
Family Restaurant, Coffee Shop."14 Should it matter that the his-
toric sign does not reflect the current tenant's business and that
preservation of the historic sign may, in fact, confuse or deter the
clientele that the children's boutique or used car dealer wishes to
attract? Similarly, historic signs can also directly dictate prejudice
long after the architectural traces of that prejudice have disap-
peared. For instance, should a business be forced to retain historic
segregation signage-such as for "Whites" and "Colored" water
fountains or bathrooms-as an act of historic preservation, even
though it could stigmatize the business or preserve a legacy of
prejudice?' 5 Can a state require a private party to retain a vestige
of such a stark economic or social legacy, especially in the uniquely
straightforward and unequivocal manner in which a sign operates?
The primary concern of this Article will be whether regulations
that require preservation of historical signs limit the operation of
present uses in a manner that constitutes compelled commercial
speech under the First Amendment. This is not an easy issue to
address-both commercial speech and historic preservation rest
upon principles and purposes that are generally not well-defined,
and even when they are defined, they are often controversial. His-
toric signs offer a unique situation in which to test the outer
bounds of both doctrines. The forced association of business owners
with historic signs can muddle or contradict a current business's
advertising, or can even cause stigmatizing associations that the
business would not otherwise choose. At the same time, signs can
be important reminders of a community's past or fixtures of its
14. See Roadside Peek, Preservation Alley: Johnie's Broiler,
http://www.roadsidepeek.com/preserv/2002/johniesbroiler/index.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2011).
15. Robert R. Weyeneth, The Architecture of Racial Segregation: The Challenges of
Preserving the Problematical Past, 27 PUB. HISTORIAN 11, 38-39 (2005). Weyeneth states:
In contemplating the survival of the material legacy of segregation, signage seems to
have been especially evanescent.. . .Today it does not occur to many of us that [segre-
gation] signs . .. that were disappearing in the 1960s had to come from somewhere.
Some were hand-lettered, of course, but once upon a time segregation signage was a
standard retail commodity widely available. As the legal foundation for segregation
was steadily undermined, it became harder and harder to purchase signs that said
"Colored" or "Whites Only." As an experiment, one white journalist set out in December
1961 to try to buy signs in Jacksonville, Florida. His visits to Woolworth's, Kress,
Western Auto, and local hardware stores all proved fruitless. Clerk after clerk reported
that the stores had returned their inventories to distributors. In this additional way-
manufacturers discontinuing a line of heretofore popular merchandise-segregation




physical typology, and may even subtly preserve a community's
legacies-both good and bad-that might otherwise be forgotten or
relegated to books.
This Article considers these implications by first reviewing
commercial-speech doctrine jurisprudence, especially as applied to
compelled speech of corporations, in Section II. Section III presents
four methods for preserving historic signs proposed by the Nation-
al Park Service. Section IV examines the last century of signage
regulation. Section V reviews the purposes and findings that sup-
port historic preservation as a governmental interest. Finally, Sec-
tion VI analyzes how the four approaches to preserving historic
signs proposed by the National Park Service fare in light of the
compelled speech case law, the purposes underpinning historic
preservation, and the National Register's significance and integri-
ty listing criteria.
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AS APPLIED TO HISTORIC SIGNS
There has been little discussion relating commercial speech 16 to
historic preservation. The silence on this topic is likely due to his-
toric preservation's longstanding focus on landmarks and architec-
turally significant buildings. Only in the past few decades, as his-
toric preservation has followed a broader mandate, has the ques-
tion of freedom of speech-in this case, a business owner's freedom
of commercial speech-become relevant.17 Given the newness of
the phenomenon, there are no known cases considering the ques-
tion of how commercial speech should fare in light of mandated
preservation of historic signs. In the absence of such case law, this
Section offers a framework for evaluating how existing commercial
speech precedent would address the issue of historic signs, espe-
cially in a situation in which a governmental action (i) mandates
the preservation of a historic sign that obscures or contradicts an
existing business owner's own on-site business signage; or (ii)
mandates preservation of a historic sign that indirectly suggests a
business's association with a historic legacy that is stigmatized in
current social norms.
Commercial speech is a relatively new doctrine by constitu-
tional standards; 8 discussion of the doctrine's merits has been
heated, and the outer limits of its protections have not been easily
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I (granting a broad freedom of speech to the people of the
United States).
17. See generally infra note 25.
18. See infra note 25, at 761 (first unveiling the commercial speech doctrine in 1976).
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defined. 9 Despite this controversy and uncertainty, both the
courts and commentators are consistent in holding that true and
factual advertising of a product is protected commercial speech.20
The United States Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Bigelow v.
Virginia first extended First Amendment protection to advertis-
ing.21 In Bigelow, the court struck down Virginia's attempt to ban
newspaper advertisements announcing the availability of New
York abortions, which were illegal in Virginia but legal in New
York.22 The Court noted that:
[Tihe advertisement conveyed information of potential in-
terest and value to a diverse audience-not only to readers
possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those
with a general curiosity about, or general interest in, the
subject matter or the law of another State and its develop-
ment, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia. . . . Thus,
in this case, appellant's First Amendment interests coincid-
ed with the constitutional interests of the general public.23
In offering First Amendment protection, the Bigelow court em-
phasized the informational importance of the advertisements, not
simply the prospect of a commercial transaction. 24 Bigelow led the
way to the Court's 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., which formally
announced the commercial speech doctrine.25 In that case, the
Court provided two distinct constitutional purposes for the com-
mercial speech doctrine:
Advertising ... is nonetheless dissemination of information
as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predom-
inantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our re-
sources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
19. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1,
2 (2000-2001) (stating that commercial speech is a "notoriously unstable and contentious
domain of First Amendment jurisprudence").
20. See infra notes 21, 26, 29, 42 and accompanying text.
21. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
22. Id. at 311, 318, 329.
23. Id. at 322.
24. Id.




informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial infor-
mation is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the
proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it
is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions
as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.
Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be
primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking
in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of in-
formation does not serve that goal.26
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy announced two rationales
for expanding free speech protection to commercial speech: com-
mercial transactions in a free enterprise economy should be intel-
ligent and well-informed, and regulation of the markets is better
achieved when there is more information. 27 These two purposes
speak to the importance of an existing business's sign as a means
of communicating the existing business's proposed transaction.
The Court has further elaborated on this core protection of ad-
vertising in the commercial speech doctrine, noting that while
"ambiguities may exist at the margins of the category of commer-
cial speech"28 and the bounds of commercial speech protected by
the First Amendment are not precise, "it is clear enough that . . .
advertising pure and simple . . . falls within those bounds."29 The
Court has also stated that the commercial speech doctrine rests
heavily on "the 'common-sense' distinction between speech propos-
ing a commercial transaction . . . and other varieties of speech."30
These cases establish that a business has a constitutional right to
advertising that promotes the elements of a commercial transac-
tion at its most basic level-the product or service offered and at
what price.
At the same time, such discussions do not address the more
subtle issues that arise in the maintenance of a historic sign that
does not propose a commercial transaction, but is maintained for
the purpose of preserving a community's history or identity. Thus,
while much discussion of commercial speech lingers on the defini-
tion of what constitutes "commercial speech," 31 this issue is inap-
26. Id. at 765 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
27. Id.
28. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993).
29. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 637 (1985).
30. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
31. Post, supra note 19, at 15 (asserting that commercial speech should be defined as
"the set of communicative acts about commercial subjects that conveys information of rele-
vance to democratic decision making, but that does not itself form part of public discourse.").
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posite to historic signs. The issue is not whether the existing busi-
ness's advertising is commercial speech, but whether the historic
sign's representations to passers-by constitute a compelled-speech
act.
The Court's compelled speech jurisprudence began with ques-
tions of ideological and political speech. In West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court invalidated a state
board of education resolution requiring children of a Jehovah's
Witness to salute the flag in order to be allowed to attend a public
school.32 In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court invalidated a New
Hampshire statute requiring vehicle license plates to carry the
state's motto, "Live Free or Die," which was challenged by a Jeho-
vah's Witness. 33 The Court stated that:
[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. . .
. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking
are complementary components of the broader concept of
"individual freedom of mind."3 4
The Court also applied such limitations against compelled
speech to corporations in the context of political speech. 35 In Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court invalidated Florida's
"right-of-reply" statute, which provided that if a newspaper as-
sailed a candidate's character or record the candidate could de-
mand that the newspaper print a reply of equal prominence and
space.36 The Court held that the statute interfered with the news-
paper's right to speak because the statute penalized the newspa-
per's own expression37 and interfered with its editorial control and
judgment.38
32. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
33. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 717 (1977).
34. Id. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-634); see also Harper & Row Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("The essential thrust of the First
Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas. .
. . There is necessarily .. . a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.") (quoting Estate of Hem-
ingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y. 2d 341, 348 (1968)).
35. See Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
36. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244 n.2 (1974).
37. Id. at 257 ("Government-enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens the vigor
and limits the variety of public debate."') (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 258 ("[Treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or un-
fair-constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment").
234 [Vol. 25:2
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Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo are indicative of one of three
strands of compelled speech cases, specifically those in which the
State attempts to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."39
Corporations have more often been addressed in a second line
of compelled commercial-speech cases, in which the doctrine has
been applied less rigorously than in relation to individuals. 40 These
cases typically review whether a state may require warnings on
advertisements for products or services. 41 Warning laws that re-
quire true and factual statements regarding products and services
have been repeatedly upheld by lower courts. 42 In Zauderer v. Of-
fice of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, the United
States Supreme Court upheld disciplinary action against an attor-
ney for failing to warn potential clients in advertisements that
they were liable for litigation costs even if they lost. 4 3 The Court
announced that "an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as
long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
State's interest in preventing deception of consumers."44 The Zau-
derer Court justified this lower threshold on compelled speech for
product warnings by noting that:
The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has
taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in
his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial infor-
mation about the terms under which his services will be
available. Because the extension of First Amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech is justified principally by the
value to consumers of the information such speech provides
.... ,appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not
39. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
40. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) ("[Tlhe interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those
discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette.").
41. See id. (requiring disclaimer on attorney ads); Nat'l. Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell,
272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding state requirement of warning label on mercury-
containing light bulbs, and noting that "[i]nnumerable federal and state regulatory pro-
grams require the disclosure of product and other commercial information."); Entm't Soft-
ware Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2006) (warnings on sexually explicit
video games); Envt'l Def. Ctr. v. U.S. E.P.A., 344 F.3d 832, 848-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (warnings
regarding waste discharge into municipal sewers); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 483 (1995) (statement of alcohol content on the label of a beer bottle).
42. See supra note 41.
43. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 636.
44. Id. at 651.
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providing any particular factual information in his advertis-
ing is minimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech
decisions to date, we have emphasized that because disclo-
sure requirements trench much more narrowly on an adver-
tiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, "warn-
ing[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ...
in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception."45
And yet, even Zauderer does not seem to adequately address the
question of historic signs. Zauderer affirms the Court's ongoing
commitment to factual, truthful information, and extends that re-
quirement even to the omission of a warning. However, this exten-
sion of disclosure requirements was itself based upon a concern for
consumer confusion and deception. 46 By requiring the warning, the
Zauderer Court sought to extend the reach of factual, truthful in-
formation and to better inform the public about the service of-
fered.47 Historic signs, however, do the exact opposite. Historic
signs do not contribute to any factual or truthful understanding of
the transaction that is offered; rather, they obfuscate that transac-
tion based upon the governmental interest in historic preservation.
Thus far, perhaps the only Supreme Court case to offer guid-
ance on this issue is Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of California (PG&E).48 In PG&E, the California Pub-
lic Utility Commission decided that a utility provider must share
the "extra space" left over in an envelope after including the bill
and required notices with a citizen's utility advocacy group, be-
cause the "extra space" was the ratepayers' property.49 The utility
provider argued that it had a First Amendment right not to help
spread a message with which it disagreed, and the Court agreed.50
Relying on Wooley and Tornillo, the Court held that:
The Commission's order forces appellant to disseminate
[the citizen advocacy group's] speech in envelopes that [the
utility] owns and that bear appellant's return address. Such
forced association with potentially hostile views burdens
the expression of views different from [the citizen's advoca-
45. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
49. Id. at 4-6.
50. Id. at 4-6, 20-21.
2386 [Vol. 25:2
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cy group] and risks forcing [the utility] to speak where it
would prefer to remain silent.5'
The Court went on to state:
As the dissenting Commissioners correctly noted,
[the utility provider's] argument logically implies that
the State may compel appellant or any other regulated
business to use many different kinds of property to ad-
vance views with which the business disagrees. "Extra
space" exists not only in billing envelopes but also on
billboards, bulletin boards, and sides of buildings and
motor vehicles. Under the Commission's reasoning, a
State could force business proprietors of such items to
use the space for the dissemination of speech the propri-
etor opposes. At least where access to such fora is grant-
ed on the basis of the speakers' viewpoints, the public's
ownership of the "extra space" does not nullify the First
Amendment rights of the owner of the property from
which that space derives.52
The Court presciently notes that "extra space" exists not only
in envelopes, but also on billboards, bulletin boards, and the sides
of buildings.53 The preservation of historic signs is based upon the
notion that the past can be preserved in the interstices-the "extra
space"-between the spaces necessary for today's commerce. Al-
ternatively, and even more practically difficult, the preservation of
historic signs is based upon the notion that the historic sign will be
read by the viewer as a palimpsest-a faded image overwritten by
the modern sign-that does not obscure, contradict, or otherwise
interfere with the ability of the current business to convey its mes-
sage. PG&E suggests, however, that the Court is dubious of such
an "extra space" argument, not to mention a palimpsestic approach
to interweaving modern and historic signage.54
On the other hand, PG&E can be distinguished in that the
Court appears to limit its discussion to those instances in which
there is viewpoint access granted, and thus a political or ideologi-
cal overtone is permitted.55 While the Court has not directly ad-
dressed the issue in a signage context, a ruling by the California
51. Id. at 17-18.
52. Id. at 18 n.15 (emphasis added).
53. See id.
54. See generally supra note 48.
55. See generally id. at 17-18 n.5.
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Supreme Court suggests that commercial speech should be consid-
ered broadly where advertising signage is concerned, and that the
protections associated with commercial speech apply even where
the advertisement may express some political or ideological view-
point.56
Finally, it should be noted that a third line of compelled-
commercial speech cases governs compelled-subsidy cases, in
which individuals are not compelled to speak, but rather to subsi-
dize a private message with which they disagree.57 Such cases con-
cern programs of compelled subsidization of generic advertising,
typically for an agricultural or livestock product.58 To the extent
that these cases have held required subsidies to be unconstitution-
al, the Court does not consider them to affect the other "true" com-
pelled-speech cases, and view them as their own distinct line of
cases.59 As such, they are not as relevant to the question of historic
56. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 261-62 (Cal. 2002). In Kasky, the court stat-
ed:
We now disapprove as ill-considered dicta two statements of this court in Spiritual
Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa .... There we remarked that commercial
speech is speech "which has but one purpose-to advance an economic transac-
tion," and we suggested that "an advertisement informing the public that the
cherries for sale at store X were picked by union workers" would be noncommer-
cial speech.
As we have explained, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that eco-
nomic motivation is relevant but not conclusive and perhaps not even necessary.
The high court has never held that commercial speech must have as its only pur-
pose the advancement of an economic transaction, and it has explained instead
that commercial speech may be intermingled with noncommercial speech. An ad-
vertisement primarily intended to reach consumers and to influence them to buy
the speaker's products is not exempt from the category of commercial speech be-
cause the speaker also has a secondary purpose to influence lenders, investors, or
lawmakers.
Nor is speech exempt from the category of commercial speech because it relates to
the speaker's labor practices rather than to the price, availability, or quality of the
speaker's goods. An advertisement to the public that cherries were picked by un-
ion workers is commercial speech if the speaker has a financial or commercial in-
terest in the sale of the cherries and if the information that the cherries had been
picked by union workers is likely to influence consumers to buy the speaker's
cherries. Speech is commercial in its content if it is likely to influence consumers
in their commercial decisions. For a significant segment of the buying public, labor
practices do matter in making consumer choices.
Id. (citations omitted).
57. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (noting two types
of compelled-speech cases: "true 'compelled-speech' cases, in which an individual is obliged
personally to express a message he disagrees with, imposed by the government; and 'com-
pelled-subsidy' cases, in which an individual is required by the government to subsidize a
message he disagrees with, expressed by a private entity.").
58. See U.S. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamura, 90 P.3d 1179 (Cal.
2004) (plum farmers' association).
59. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 416 ("Our conclusions are not inconsistent with the
Court's decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel .. . .").
HISTORIC SIGNS
signs because such signs do not require subsidization of an adver-
tising campaign.60
This review of commercial speech doctrine indicates that ques-
tions of historic signs do not fit neatly within the contours of the
delineated case law, and courts have developed a varied and dis-
parate jurisprudence with regard to different types of signs.61 If
"[e]ach method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself and
that law must reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses[,] and
dangers' of each method," then the historic sign will require its own
jurisprudence, just as billboards and sound trucks have before
them. 6 2 The remainder of this Article will attempt to propose an
outline for that jurisprudence, including a review of historic sign
regulation today, as well as a review of the governmental purposes
that support such regulations.
III. METHODS FOR PRESERVING HISTORIC SIGNS
Preservation Brief Number 25, The Preservation of Historic
Signs (Preservation Brief 25), is the National Park Service's tem-
plate for documenting and preserving historic signs,63 and is there-
fore the most complete and influential document on how such
preservation of historic signs should occur.
Preservation Brief 25 provides that historic signs should be re-
tained "whenever possible," and:
[Pjarticularly when they are[ associated with historic fig-
ures, events or place[s]; significant as evidence of the histo-
60. Id.
61. Courts have addressed a wide variety of sign issues, including signs at labor dis-
putes (State v. DeAngelo, A.2d 1200 (N.J. 2009)); murals (Carpenter v. City of Snohomish,
2007 WL 1742161 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007)); whether a column of light constitutes a sign
(Sutliff Enters., Inc. v. Silver Spring Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 933 A.2d 1079 (Pa. 2007));
lawn signs (Blum & Bellino, Inc. v. Town of Greenburgh, 872 N.Y.S.2d 172 (2009)); church
signs (Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City, Inc. v. People's Counsel for Baltimore
County, 941 A.2d 560 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)); electronic billboards (Naser Jewelers, Inc.
v. City of Concord, 538 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2008)); favoring commercial speech over non-
commercial speech (Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. Town of Surfside Beach, 321 Fed. Appx.
251 (4th Cir. 2009)).
62. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (citing Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)). The Kovacs Court noted:
I do not agree that, if we sustain regulations or prohibitions of sound trucks, they
must therefore be valid if applied to other methods of 'communication of ideas.'
The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound
truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses[,] and
dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself, and all we are dealing with now is
the sound truck.
Kovacs, 366 U.S. at 97 (Jackson, J. concurring).
63. AUER, supra note 8 (conclusion).
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ry of the product, business or service advertised[;] signifi-
cant as reflecting the history of the building or the devel-
opment of the historic district[;] . . . characteristic of a spe-
cific historic period, such as gold leaf on glass, neon, or
stainless steel lettering[;] integral to the building's design
or physical fabric[;] . . . outstanding examples of the sign-
maker's art[;] local landmarks . . . [where the sign is] recog-
nized as popular focal point in a community[;] [or] elements
important in defining the character of a district, such as
marquees in a theater district.64
Preservation Brief 25 also provides four prescribed methods by
which historic signs should be reused in their new capacity in the
building.65 First, the preferred alternative is to keep the historic
sign unaltered.66 The National Park Service prefers that the old
sign be left in its historic location, although it acknowledges that,
"sometimes . . . it may be necessary to move the sign elsewhere on
the building to accommodate a new one."67 The National Park Ser-
vice also acknowledges that "it may be necessary to relocate new
signs to avoid hiding or overwhelming historic ones, or to redesign
proposed new signs so that the old ones may remain."68 The Na-
tional Park Service argues that:
Keeping the old sign is often a good marketing strategy. It
can exploit the recognition value of the old name and play
upon the public's fondness for the old sign. The advertising
value of an old sign can be immense. This is especially true
when the sign is a community landmark.69
At the same time, Preservation Brief 25 notes that "[t]he legit-
imate advertising needs of current tenants, however, must be rec-
ognized."70 Preservation Brief 25 offers no discussion of how to de-
termine the legitimate advertising needs of current tenants.
The second approach to reusing a historic sign is "to relocate it
to the interior of the building, such as in the lobby or above the bar
in a restaurant."7' The National Park Service considers this option
64. Id. (retaining historic signs).
65. See generally id.








to be "less preferable than keeping the sign outside the building."72
The third approach to reusing historic signs is to modify "the sign
for use with the new business."73 The National Park Service
acknowledges that "[t]his may not be possible without destroying
essential features, but in some cases it can be done by changing
details only."7 4 If none of the other options are possible, the fourth
and least favored approach is to donate the sign "to a local muse-
um, preservation organization or other group."75 This approach
preserves the sign, but typically at an off-site location that pre-
vents the sign from retaining or contributing to its historical con-
text.
Thus, Preservation Brief 25 provides for a wide range of options
for historic signs-from preserving the historic sign unaltered, to
removing it and placing it in a museum-that would have dramat-
ically different results both for the current business owner and for
historic preservation. 76 Determining the validity of these ap-
proaches in light of the requirements of the commercial speech
doctrine requires a consideration of the governmental interests
that support historic preservation.
IV. REGULATING SIGNS
The primary focus of sign regulation over the past century has
been on eliminating signs, not preserving them.77 Although some
initial regulations were rejected by the courts, restrictions on
signs-and especially billboards-were eventually held to be valid
as exercises of the police power in preserving health and safety,
and later, aesthetics.78
The billboard industry foresaw the coming regulation and as
early as 1872 began the formation of trade groups, such as the St.
Louis' International Bill Posters Organization of North America. 7 9
By 1909, such groups were attempting to regulate their own mem-
bers and prevent them from indiscriminate posting.80
Nonetheless, regulation of the billboard increased commensu-




75. Id. Las Vegas may well be the capital of preserving historic signs in museums.
See, e.g., The Neon Museum, Las Vegas, available at http://www.neonmuseum.org/.
76. See supra notes 63-75.
77. See infra note 79.
78. See infra notes 82-83.
79. See Kramer, supra note 3, at 15; see also AUER, supra note 8 (sign regulation).
80. Kramer, supra note 3, at 15.
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case of City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising and
Sign Painting Co., the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
rejected the use of the police power to regulate billboards solely on
the basis of aesthetics.8' However, with the 1954 case of Berman v.
Parker, the Court first acknowledged aesthetic regulation as a
proper concern of the police power for regulation of land uses and
generally held that "[i]t is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy . . . ."82 Subsequent cases have relied upon aesthetics as a
legitimate purpose for regulating signage.83
Independent of aesthetics, use of the police power to regulate
signs was also justified by more traditional concerns, such as "fire
control, sanitation, traffic safety," or "morality."84 The earliest suc-
cess in this regard was the 1911 case of St. Louis Gunning Adver-
tising Company v. City of St. Louis,85 in which the Supreme Court
of Missouri held, as part of an enumerated parade of horribles,
that billboards are "constant menaces to the public safety and wel-
fare of the city; they endanger the public health, promote immoral-
ity, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and all clas-
ses of miscreants."86 While such elaborate findings may stretch the
81. City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting Co., 287, 62 A.
267, 268 (N.J. 1905). The Patterson court held:
It is probable that the enactment of ... the ordinance was due rather to aesthetic
considerations than to considerations of the public safety. No case has been cited,
nor are we aware of any case which holds that a man may be deprived of his prop-
erty because his tastes are not those of his neighbors. Aesthetic [sic] considera-
tions are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is ne-
cessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power ....
Id.
82. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). The Court goes on to state: "If those
who govern ... decide that ... [their community] . . . should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way." Id.
83. See. e.g., Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 805 (1984) ("It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers
to advance esthetic values.").
84. Kramer, supra note 3, at 19-20.
85. St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929 (Mo. 1911).
86. Id. at 942. The St. Louis Gunnder Advertising Co. court stated:
The signboards and billboards upon which this class of advertisements are displayed
are constant menaces to the public safety and welfare of the city; they endanger the
public health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals
and all classes of miscreants. They are also inartistic and unsightly. In cases of fire
they often cause their spread and constitute barriers against their extinction; and in
cases of high wind, their temporary character, frail structure and broad surface, render
them liable to be blown down and to fall upon and injure those who may happen to be
in their vicinity. The evidence shows and common observation teaches us that the
ground in the rear thereof is being constantly used as privies and dumping ground for
all kinds of waste and deleterious matters, and thereby creating public nuisances and
jeopardizing public health; the evidence also shows that behind these obstructions the
lowest form of prostitution and other acts of immorality are frequently carried on, al-
most under public gaze; they offer shelter and concealment for the criminal while lying
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bounds of credulity, they did provide legal justification for the reg-
ulation of billboards, and have resulted in federal regulation such
as the Highway Beautification Act of 196587 and numerous state
and local regulations of the billboard industry.88 Despite this cen-
tury-long history of sign regulation, the compelled preservation of
a historic sign does not yet appear to have been addressed in a re-
ported decision.
V. PURPOSES OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION
The modern legal justification for historic preservation-like
that for the modern regulation of signage-is typically considered
to derive from Berman v. Parker's acceptance of using the police
power for aesthetic considerations. 89 In addition to aesthetics,
Berman provided a broad justification for use of the police powers,
extending those powers beyond the typical aspects of public safety,
health, and welfare. 90 However, as historic preservation has grown
in wait for his victim; and last, but not least, they obstruct the light, sunshine, and air,
which are so conducive to health and comfort. House signs and sky signs are similar to
billboards, and are used for the same purposes, except they are attached to the walls of
buildings or are constructed upon the roofs thereof. They endanger the public safety on-
ly in being liable to be blown down and injure people in their fall. They also assist in
the spread of fire and greatly interfere with their extinction. The amount of good con-
tained in this class of this business is so small in comparison to the great and numer-
ous evils incident thereto that it has caused me to wonder why some of the courts of the
country have seen fit to go as far as they have in holding statutes and ordinances of
this class void, which were only designed for the suppression of the evils incident there-
to and not to the suppression of the business itself. While advertising, as before stated,
is a legitimate and honorable business, yet the evils incident to this class of advertising
are more numerous and base in character than are those incident to numerous other
businesses which are considered mala in se; and which for that reason may not only be
regulated and controlled, but which may be entirely suppressed for the public good un-
der the police power of the state. My individual opinion is that this class of advertising
as now conducted is not only subject to control and regulation by the police power of the
state, but that it might be entirely suppressed by statute, and that, too, without offend-
ing against either the state or federal Constitution.
Id.
87. Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) (controls outdoor ad-
vertising along 306,000 miles of Federal-Aid Primary, Interstate and National Highway
System (NHS) roads).
88. See, e.g., Outdoor Adver. Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§5200-5486 (1970); City
S.F. ORDINANCE No. 263-65 (Nov. 21, 1965) (city's first sign ordinance distinguishing be-
tween on-site and off-site advertising signage).
89. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). The irony, of course, is that the Berman
decision permitted the razing of a whole area of historic buildings for urban renewal. Id. at
28-30.
90. Id. at 32. The Berman Court goes on to note:
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each
case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legisla-
tive determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither
abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific consti-
tutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
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in scope from its consideration of architectural merit alone it is un-
clear whether historic preservation's purposes still fall within the
broad mandates of Berman.9 ' Consideration is due as to whether
preservation's current enterprise fits within the police powers pur-
poses on which it is traditionally seen to rest, and whether such
purposes reach far enough to compel speech emanating from
ephemera such as historic signs.
A. Monuments, Architecture, and Community Building
Historic preservation has long neglected its own history.92
Where attempts to document the history have been undertaken,
investigations of the movement's origin are often more in line with
the particular historian's focus than with anything definitive.93
The perceived wide berth of origins is not surprising, however, giv-
en the wide stance of the current historic preservation movement,
as well as the variety of influences that now rest under its man-
tle.94
Historic preservation's history is typically divided into three
distinct phases. The nineteenth century's focus was on preserving
monuments as part of creating a national identity.95 The mid-
twentieth century's efforts sought to protect buildings and historic
districts that possessed architectural merit from the wrecking ball
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. . . . Public safety, public health, morality,
peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples
of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they
merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.
Id.
91. Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Histor-
ic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 476 (1981) ("The phrase 'historic preservation' is so
elastic that any sort of project can be justified-or any change vilified-in its name. In a
sense, every event is 'history,' and it is a clichi among professional historians that views of
'historic significance' alter considerably with shifting social interests . . . .").
92. Max Page & Randall Mason, Rethinking the Roots of the Historic Preservation
Movement, in GIVING PRESERVATION A HISTORY: HISTORIES OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 3 (Max Page & Randall Mason eds., 2004).
93. Howard L. Green, The Social Construction of Historical Significance, in
PRESERVATION OF WHAT, FOR WHOM? A CRITICAL LOOK AT HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE 86
(Michael A. Tomlan ed., 1998) ("Historic preservation as we know it, though it has earlier
antecedents, is a piece of the environmental conservation movement of the 1960s and 1970s
. .. ."); cf. Barbara Shubinski, The Mechanics of Nostalgia: The 1930s Legacy for Historic
Preservation, in PRESERVATION OF WHAT, FOR WHOM? A CRITICAL LOOK AT HISTORICAL
SIGNIFICANCE 69 (Michael A. Tomlan ed., 1998) ('The groundwork laid by Boasian anthro-
pology [in the Works Progress Administration's efforts] affected, at least indirectly, and
perhaps was necessary to the very formation of preservation efforts on a federal level.").
94. See Rose, supra note 91, at 476.
95. Id. at 481-84.
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of urban renewal.96 The current emphasis is on preservation as a
means of memorializing and advancing a community's identity.97
The nineteenth century American interest in preserving mon-
uments as a means of defining a national identity was not unusu-
al. In fact, the importance of doing so was advocated by European
intellectuals of the time,98 many of whom were engaged in the res-
toration 99 --or plundering' 00-of sacred ruins and antiquities to de-
fine and strengthen nationalistic identity. Many of the "monu-
ments" preserved in America during this time memorialized im-
portant figures of the Revolutionary War. For instance, the most
iconic American nineteenth century preservation effort was that of
George Washington's Mount Vernon estate by the Mount Vernon
Ladies Association.101 The Association purchased the home and
two hundred-acre estate with contributions solicited from women
in every state, thereby saving the home from demolition and the
site from development. 102
The second phase is typically defined as that call to arms re-
sulting from the demolition of New York's Pennsylvania Station in
1963103 and the destruction of large swaths of inner cities in ac-
cordance with post-World War II urban renewal programs.104 This
phase saw the rise of the most visible and institutionalized aspects
of the historic preservation efforts-the federal, state, and local
historic preservation laws. 05
96. Id. at 484-88.
97. Id. at 488-92.
98. Rudy J. Koshar, On Cults and Cultists: German Historic Preservation in the Twen-
tieth Century, in GIVING PRESERVATION A HISTORY: HISTORIES OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 45, 49 (Max Page & Randall Mason eds., 2004) (German historian
Georg Dehio announced that "[w]e conserve a monument not because we consider it beauti-
ful, but because it is a piece of our national life"); see generally JUKKA JOKILEHTO, A HISTORY
OF ARCHITECTURAL CONSERVATION 69-100 (Andrew Oddy & Derek Linstrum eds. 1999)
(2002).
99. See JOKILEHTO, supra note 98. For a consideration of modern European approach-
es, see Francois Quintard-Morenas, Preservation of Historic Properties' Environs: American
and French Approaches, 36 URB. LAw. 137 (2004).
100. See CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE PARTHENON MARBLES: THE CASE FOR
REUNIFICATION (2008).
101. Page & Mason, supra note 92, at 6.
102. Diane Lea, America's Preservation Ethos: A Tribute to Enduring Ideals, in A
RICHER HERITAGE: HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (Robert E.
Stipe ed., 2003); Page & Mason, supra note 92, at 6-7.
103. Page & Mason, supra note 92, at 7.
104. PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW 228-29 (2d ed. 1996) ("Using the powers to tear
down slums asnd [sic] offer prime land to private developers with government subsidy, cities
sought 'the blight that's right,' as Charles Abrams inimitably put it. In city after city-
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Hartford, Boston, San Francisco-the areas that were cleared
were the low-income, black sections next to the central business district . . .
105. See infra notes 106-117.
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The most important of these new laws was the National Histor-
ic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA).0 6 The NHPA became the
"most far-reaching" federal regulation governing historical re-
sources, and "expanded the National Register of Historic Places"
(National Register) to include "historic properties of local and
statewide significance."10 7 At the time, President Johnson stated
that the NHPA would "allow us . . . to take stock of the buildings
and the properties that are a part of our rich history and to ade-
quately preserve these treasures properly."108 In the years since,
more than 73,000 entries have been made to the National Register,
as well as more than "11,000 . . . historic or architectural districts
comprised of numerous individual buildings or sites."109 The Na-
tional Park Service estimates there are more than one million in-
dividual buildings or sites listed in the National Register.110 His-
toric signs are included on National Register, such as the "Wel-
come to Fabulous Las Vegas" sign.'
At the local level, the city of Charleston, South Carolina,
passed the nation's first zoning ordinance in 1931 for "the preser-
vation and protection of historic places and areas of historic inter-
est."112 Although slow to gain momentum at the local level,113 the
number of local governments with historic preservation zoning or-
dinances rose dramatically in the middle part of the century. Ac-
cording to Weyeneth, "by the 1970s[,] more than two hundred
American cities had enacted municipal ordinances to protect his-
torically . .. significant private property."114 By the 1990s, there
were more than eighteen hundred such ordinances." 5 The rapid
rise of local historic preservation ordinances is partly attributable
to the U.S. Supreme Court's Penn Central decision, which upheld
New York City's landmarks law that sought to prevent Penn Cen-
tral's owners from building a skyscraper on top of the existing
106. 16 U.S.C. § 470 - 470t (1966).
107. Lea, supra note 102, at 11 (citation omitted).
108. Green, supra note 93, at 86.
109. John M. Fowler, The Federal Preservation Program, in A RICHER HERITAGE:
HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 42 (Robert E. Stipe ed., 2003).
110. Id.
111. Nat'1 Parks Serv., National Register of Historic Places Registration Form, The
"Welcome to Fabulous Las Vegas" Sign, Reference Number 09000284, listed 5/01/09, availa-
ble at http://www.nps.gov/nr/listings/20090508.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
112. 1927-1931 JOURNAL OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA 697-
711 (1931); see also Robert R. Weyeneth, Ancestral Architecture: The Early Preservation
Movement in Charleston, in GIVING PRESERVATION A HISTORY: HISTORIES OF HISTORIC
PRESERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES 268 (Max Page & Randall Mason eds., 2004) (citation
omitted).
113. Weyeneth, supra note 112, at 273.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 275 (citation omitted).
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Beaux Arts Grand Central train station.116 For the first time, Penn
Central established that historic preservation regulations were not
only a legitimate use of the police power, but also that they were
not subject to compensation as a taking so long as certain parame-
ters were met.117
The third phase of the historic preservation movement is typi-
cally defined as arising in the 1980s and continuing to the present.
In this era, preservation is, in the words of one commentator,
"search[ing] for a new mandate.""18 This era has seen the rise of an
effort to be inclusive of a diverse range of histories and to embrace
a historicism far beyond the preservation of monuments or archi-
tecturally significant buildings."19 This diverse scope of preserva-
tion has as its germinal seed the expansive list of objects eligible
for listing on the National Register, which includes: "districts,
sites, buildings, structures, and objects ... that have made a sig-
nificant contribution to the broad patterns of our history,"120 as
well as in the listing criteria and considerations for listing crite-
ria.121 While this expansiveness has been in the NHPA since its
116. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Lea,
supra note 102, at 14-15.
117. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Penn Central Court notes:
[T]he Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particular signifi-
cance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
Id. (citations omitted).
118. Lea, supra note 102, at 18.
119. See id.
120. See Dolores Hayden, Placemaking, Preservation and Urban History, 41 J.
ARCHITECTURAL EDUC. 45, 46 (1984); see also 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1966).
121. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2009). The Regulation states:
The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering,
and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess
integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association
and (a) that are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the
broad patterns of our history; or (b) that are associated with the lives of persons signifi-
cant in our past; or (c) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or
method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high ar-
tistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose compo-
nents may lack individual distinction; or (d) that have yielded, or may be likely to yield,
information important in prehistory or history.
Criteria considerations. Ordinarily cemeteries, birthplaces, or graves of historical fig-
ures, properties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes, struc-
tures that have been moved from their original locations, reconstructed historic build-
ings, properties primarily commemorative in nature, and properties that have achieved
significance within the past 50 years shall not be considered eligible for the National
Register. However, such properties will qualify if they are integral parts of districts
that do meet the criteria of [sic] if they fall within the following categories:
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first passage, preservationists are now paying more attention to
the non-building categories than before.
The findings for the National Register provide a broad mandate
regarding the purposes of historic preservation, including cultural,
educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy bene-
fits. 12 2
Similarly, the National Trust's eight "Charleston Principles,"
adopted in 1990, also act as a guide for community conservation.123
(a) A religious property deriving primary significance from architectural or artistic dis-
tinction or historical importance; or (b) A building or structure removed from its origi-
nal location but which is significant primarily for architectural value, or which is the
surviving structure most importantly associated with a historic person or event; or (c)
A birthplace or grave of a historical figure of outstanding importance if there is no ap-
propriate site or building directly associated with his productive life. (d) A cemetery
which derives its primary significance from graves of persons of transcendent im-
portance, from age, from distinctive design features, or from association with historic
events; or (e) A reconstructed building when accurately executed in a suitable envi-
ronment and presented in a dignified manner as part of a restoration master plan, and
when no other building or structure with the same association has survived; or (f) A
property primarily commemorative in intent if design, age, tradition, or symbolic value
has invested it with its own exceptional significance; or (g) A property achieving signif-
icance within the past 50 years if it is of exceptional importance.
Id.
122. The findings for the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 state:
(1) the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its his-
toric heritage; (2) the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be
preserved as a living part of our community life and development in order to give
a sense of orientation to the American people; (3) historic properties significant to
the Nation's heritage are being lost or substantially altered, often inadvertently,
with increasing frequency; (4) the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in
the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspi-
rational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future
generations of Americans; (5) in the face of ever-increasing extensions of urban
centers, highways, and residential, commercial, and industrial developments, the
present governmental and nongovernmental historic preservation programs and
activities are inadequate to insure future generations a genuine opportunity to
appreciate and enjoy the rich heritage of our Nation; (6) the increased knowledge
of our historic resources, the establishment of better means of identifying and ad-
ministering them, and the encouragement of their preservation will improve the
planning and execution of Federal and federally assisted projects and will assist
economic growth and development; and (7) although the major burdens of historic
preservation have been borne and major efforts initiated by private agencies and
individuals, and both should continue to play a vital role, it is nevertheless neces-
sary and appropriate for the Federal Government to accelerate its historic preser-
vation programs and activities, to give maximum encouragement to agencies and
individuals undertaking preservation by private means, and to assist State and
local governments and the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United
States to expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and activi-
ties.
16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(1)-(7).
123. The Charleston Principles were first adopted by the National Trust for Historic
Preservation's National Conference in October, 1990, and were subsequently adopted by the
United States Conference of Mayors in June, 1991. The Charleston Principles are as follows:
1) Identify historic places, both architectural and natural, that give the community its spe-
cial character and that can aid its future well-being; 2) Adopt the preservation of historic
places as a goal of planning for land use, economic development, housing for all income lev-
els, and transportation; 3) Create organizational, regulatory, and incentive mechanisms to
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The Charleston Principles include such broad provisions as "use a
community's heritage to educate citizens of all ages and to build
civic pride" and "recognize the cultural diversity of communities
and empower a diverse constituency to acknowledge, identify, and
preserve America's cultural and physical resources."124
Proponents of a more inclusive historic preservation effort,
such as Dolores Hayden, have emphasized that the movement
should "celebrate the history of their citizens' most typical activi-
ties-earning a living, raising a family, carrying on local holidays,
and campaigning for economic development or better municipal
services."125 Other commentators have similarly urged that histori-
cal significance should not be a matter for the experts and historic
preservation professionals, but rather enshrine the values placed
on an environment by the community that lives there.126
This increasing focus on the community-both in shaping the
procedures of historic preservation and as the end users of the pro-
cess-has become dominant in the field. Yet, such inclusivity is
fraught with the same questions that the explosion of histories in
the latter-half of the twentieth century brought to effective narra-
tives: whose history are we telling? Whose heroes receive promi-
nence? Does the celebration and enshrinement of "typical activi-
ties" ennoble the quotidian at the expense of rewarding achieve-
ment? Bringing these questions to the city landscape poses addi-
tional concerns, as they must compete with the evocation of archi-
facilitate preservation, and provide the leadership to make them work; 4) Develop revitali-
zation strategies that capitalize on the existing value of historic residential and commercial
neighborhoods and properties, and provide well-designed affordable housing without dis-
placing existing residents; 5) Ensure that policies and decisions on community growth and
development respect a community's heritage and enhance overall livability; 6) Demand ex-
cellence in design for new construction and in the stewardship of historic properties and
places; 7) Use a community's heritage to educate citizens of all ages and to build civic pride;
8) Recognize the cultural diversity of communities and empower a diverse constituency to
acknowledge, identify, and preserve America's cultural and physical resources. Charleston
Charms Preservationists, 12 HISTORIC PRESERVATION NEWS 8 (December 1990); see also
Lea, supra note 102, at 18.
124. Charleston Charms Preservationists, 12 HISTORIC PRESERVATION NEWS 8 (Decem-
ber 1990).
125. Hayden, supra note 120, at 46. Hayden notes:
One reason for the neglect of ethnic and women's history is that landmark nomi-
nations everywhere in the United States frequently have been the province of pas-
sionate rather than dispassionate individuals-politicians seeking fame or favor,
businessmen exploiting the commercial advantages of specific locations, and archi-
tectural critics establishing their own careers by promoting specific persons or
styles.
Id.
126. Rose, supra note 91, at 533 ("A major public purpose underlying modern preserva-
tion law is the fostering of community cohesion, and ultimately, the encouragement of plu-
ralism."); Green, supra note 93, at 92 ("Meaning is socially made. Historical significance is
about meaning in the public realm. It is all historical, but it is not all equally historically
meaningful, i.e. significant.").
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tectural style and ornament, as well as urban scale and methods of
living, that raise equal passions independent of preserving person-
al and collective identities.
B. Harmony, Tourism, and Property Values
The purposes announced by some of the most prominent histor-
ic preservation ordinances in the country speak not of health or
safety, but of the more "genteel" purposes of tourism, aesthetics,
and property values. The City of Charleston's historic preservation
ordinance provides in part:
In order to promote the economic and general welfare of the
city and of the public generally, and to insure the harmoni-
ous, orderly and efficient growth and development of the
municipality, it is deemed essential by the city council of
the city that the qualities relating to the history of the city
and a harmonious outward appearance of structures which
preserve property values and attract tourist and residents
alike be preserved . . . .127
The City of Alexandria, Virginia, similarly notes the importance of
tourism, property values, and aesthetics as purposes of the city's
historic preservation ordinance.128
When historic preservation is premised on such notions as
tourism, property values, and aesthetics, the idea of a harmonious
development in a historic district becomes an important require-
ment in support of these purposes.129 Such a notion has become
ubiquitous, and codes routinely require new development to
demonstrate "appropriate[ness]" to the historic district.130 Design
guidelines are often created, as in New Orleans and Nantucket,13
to maintain "indigenous" architectural legacies, which often
evolved over hundreds of years, and are subsequently rigidly codi-
fied to prevent any further evolution.132 This rigidity of design of-
ten accompanies the gentrification of a historic district.133 Historic
127. CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 54-230 (2003); David F. Tipson, Putting the History
Back in Historic Preservation, 36 URB. LAW. 289, 295 (2004) (quoting CHARLESTON, S.C.,
CODE § 54-230).
128. See ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE § 2-4-32 (1982); see also Tipson, supra note 127, at
296-97.
129. Tipson, supra note 127, at 295.
130. Id. at 299-300.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 299-301.
133. Id. at 309.
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signs are often regulated under such requirements, including both
the maintenance of historic signs, as well as the dimensions of new
signs in historic districts.134
These "purpose" clauses are viewed by some as being in opposi-
tion to a more inclusive approach to historic preservation, which
should be, as Carol Rose proposed, focused on "the fostering of
community cohesion, and ultimately, the encouragement of plural-
ism."135 As Rose continues, "[p]reservation law encourages a physi-
cal environment that supports community; it also provides proce-
dures that can themselves organize a community, both by focusing
the members' attention on aspects of the physical environment
that can make them feel at home and by defining a smaller com-
munity's contribution to a larger."136 Others have similarly stated
that the significance of a landscape feature should be evaluated:
[N]ot as it exists in isolation, but for its capacity to corrobo-
rate the important narratives that constitute the specific
history of a community. . . . [T]he primary criterion of re-
view would be the extent to which such alterations demol-
ish historic fabric or obscure narratives that the community
wishes to be expressed in the landscape.137
In this way, purposes such as harmony, appropriateness, tourism,
and property values stand in opposition to a more broad-based,
community-focused preservation effort.
C. The City as Masterwork
In his Penn Central dissent, Justice Rehnquist notes that one
of the ironies of historic preservation is that "Penn Central is pre-
vented from further developing its property basically because too
good a job was done in designing and building it."138 The Penn Cen-
tral majority did not directly address this issue, although Joseph
Sax has stated that the Court should not have shied away from
recognizing the affirmative obligation of the owner-as-steward, be-
cause by engaging an artist to create a masterwork the owner has
prevented the artist from otherwise engaging in commissions that
134. Burant, supra note 2, at 67-73; Kramer, supra note 3, at 27-45.
135. Rose, supra note 91, at 533.
136. Id. at 533-34.
137. Tipson, supra note 127, at 314-15.
138. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 103, 146 (1978) (emphasis
omitted).
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would have been preserved.139 By making such an argument, Sax
is in essence grafting the rule of law governing fine art, which pre-
vents destruction of a masterwork without the artist's consent, on-
to the city itself.140
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz has responded, however, that owners of
buildings must retain the ancient "right to destroy," and that
"overprotection of existing buildings will result in some future
buildings never getting built." 141 As Strahilevitz asserts, "[a]s soci-
ety becomes increasingly hostile to the right to destroy, there is a
strong possibility that the pendulum will swing too far toward
overprotection of extant structures." 142 The Roman property right
of "the jus utendi fruendi abutendi: the rights to use the principal
(i.e., the property), to use the income generated by the property, or
to completely consume and destroy the property,"143 was absorbed
by the prominent British legal commentator William Blackstone
and was incorporated throughout much of the nation's legal histo-
ry.144 Strahilevitz cites the 1960 case of State of Illinois ex rel.
Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, in which an Illinois appellate court held
that a "building owner was entitled to a demolition permit where
the costs of repairing and maintaining a historically significant
building were high and where the owner would still lose money
operating the building if it were fully renovated at the public's ex-
pense."145
139. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
IN CULTURAL TREASURES 58 (1999). Sax states:
The question that the [Penn Central] majority declined to address is whether "ordinary
standards" should apply to the owner of an architectural masterwork. Justice
Rehnquist deserved a reply to the paradox he had identified. Perhaps the best answer
is that while the patrons (or owners) of an important work of architecture were not
obliged to engage with a masterwork, having done so they have by their own voluntary
act potentially made the community worse off than it would have been if they had nev-
er acted. It is insufficient to say that the work would not have existed without their
patronage. For they have diverted the time and effort of an artist from other work he
might have done, and that-in other hands-might have been better protected or made
more widely accessible. In that respect, to engage with an important artist or artifact is
to make oneself responsible. In perhaps an even more obvious way, those who patron-
ize a great architect not only divert that individual from other opportunities, but put a
structure upon the landscape that inevitably shapes and changes the community
around it. It is hardly a purely private act.
Id.
140. Id. at 21-34.
141. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 816 n.142
(2005).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 787.
144. Id. at 816.
145. Illinois ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 171 N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960);
Strahilevitz, supra note 141, at 816-17 (citing Ramsey, 171 N.E. 2d at 247-48).
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Sax's proposed affirmative obligation to preserve city master-
works would seemingly create increasing uncertainty for the prop-
erty owner, as its reach could ostensibly extend beyond any land-
marking or designation of a building or structure, and its reach
could lead to property owners being held accountable for the demo-
lition or destruction of properties that have received no formal rat-
ing.146
D. City Taxidermy, the Image of the City,
and the City as Palimpsest
Proponents of city development in the early twentieth century
often paraded brash boosterism as visionary ideas. Architects such
as Louis Sullivan could state that a skyscraper "must be every inch
a proud and soaring thing, rising in sheer exultation,"'4 7 City
Beautiful planners like Daniel Burnham could demand that one
"[m]ake no little plans," as "they have no magic to stir men's
blood,"148 and modernist visionaries could implore the destruction
of whole cities on the basis of a metaphor. Le Corbusier famously
sought to raze central Paris because its winding roads reflected
"the Pack-Donkey's Way," while the linear, modernist lines of the
city he proposed reflected elements of reason.149 This ideological
146. Works of a master are a means of finding historical significance alone. See NAT'L
PARK SERV., NATIONAL REGISTER BULLETIN, How To APPLY THE NATIONAL REGISTER
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 20 (1995) [hereinafter How To APPLY THE NATIONAL REGISTER
CRITERIA]. Sax's argument takes this one step further, however, in noting a legal obligation
to preserve even prior to a determination of significance. See SAX, supra note 139.
147. Louis H. Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOTT'S
MONTHLY MAGAZINE 403, AT PAR. II (Mar. 1896).
148. See THOMAS S. HINES, BURNHAM OF CHICAGO: ARCHITECT AND PLANNER 401 n.8
(2d ed. 2009) (1974). Hines notes:
The origins of the 'Make No Little Plans' motto are ambiguous and difficult to
document. Burnham apparently never wrote out or delivered the piece in the
exact, and now famous, sequence quoted by Charles Moore in Daniel H. Burnham,
Architect, Planner of Cities, II (Boston, 1921), 147. Moore's version, according to
Daniel Burnham, Jr., was copied from the one used by Willis Polk, Burnham's San
Francisco friend and junior associate, on Christmas cards that Polk sent out in
1912, following Burnham's death the previous June. Most of the statement was
drawn directly from Burnham's address at the 1910 London Town Planning Con-
ference, 'The City of the Future Under a Democratic Government,' Transactions of
the Royal Institute of British Architects (October 1910), 368-78. Since Polk as-
cribed the entire statement to Burnham, the additional lines were probably drawn
by Polk from conversations or correspondence with Burnham that are now lost.
The entire statement is consistent with and appropriate to Burnham's views and
values. Its sentiments, and frequently its phrasing, are reiterated throughout his
correspondence, speeches, and published writing.
Id.
149. LE CORBUSIER, THE CITY OF To-MORROW AND ITS PLANNING 11 (Frederick Etchells
trans., Architectural Press, 3d ed. 1971) (1924). Le Corbusier states:
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approach lent a moralism to razing the old parts of the city, even
once described as eliminating the "cancer" of urban blight from the
city.150 Decisions such as Berman gave credence to these theories
by expanding the police power to give cities the ability to enact
these new ideas, often through vast redevelopment schemes that
tore down older portions of cities.'5' Redevelopment, though, even-
tually engendered sustained revolts against both the racial divides
such projects were premised upon and intent on fortifying,152 and
the super-block scale of the city that they were creating.a53
Jane Jacobs was perhaps the best known figure to provide a
voice for the small-scale city.154 While Jacobs supported small-scale
neighborhoods, such as New York's Greenwich Village and Bos-
ton's North End,155 she was dubious of over-planning at this scale,
even for preservation. Jacobs warned:
When we deal with cities we are dealing with life at its
most complex and intense. Because this is so, there is a
basic esthetic limitation on what can be done with cities: A
city cannot be a work of art.
To approach a city, or even a city neighborhood, as if it were
a larger architectural problem, capable of being given order
by converting it into a disciplined work of art, is to make
the mistake of attempting to substitute art for life. The re-
sults of such profound confusion between art and life are
neither life nor art. They are taxidermy. In its place, taxi-
dermy can be a useful and decent craft. However, it goes too
far when the specimens put on display are exhibitions of
dead, stuffed cities. Like all attempts at art which get far
away from the truth and which lose respect for what they
Man walks in a straight line because he has a goal and knows where he is going;
he has made up his mind to reach some particular place and he goes straight to it.
The pack-donkey meanders along, meditates a little in his scatter-brained and dis-
tracted fashion, he zigzags in order to avoid the larger stones, or to ease the climb,
or to gain a little shade; he takes the line of least resistance.
Id.
150. Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Pri-
vate Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 1, 18 (2003) (citing Joseph D.
McGoldrick, The Super-Block Instead of Slums, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 54-55 (Nov. 19, 1944)).
151. See HALL, supra note 104; see also ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER
CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 57-82 (1995).
152. See CHESTER HARTMAN & SARAH CARNOCHAN, CITY FOR SALE: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF SAN FRANCISCO 76-102 (2002).
153. See Joseph D. McGoldrick, The Super-Block Instead of Slums, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
54-55 (Nov. 19, 1944).
154. See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 3-4 (Vin-
tage Edition 1992) (1961).
155. Id. at 5-10, 125, 183.
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deal with, this craft of city taxidermy becomes, in the hands
of its master practitioners, continually more picky and pre-
cious. This is the only form of advance possible to it.156
While Jacobs' was arguably the most notable voice on this is-
sue, Kevin Lynch was the most influential planner to lay out an
alternative vision for how the city could be imagined and main-
tained on a small scale.15 7 Lynch conducted seminal studies on how
citizens of cities referenced their urban landscape, and developed a
typology to convey this "image of the city" that urban citizens used
to locate themselves, both spatially and personally, within the
city.158 This typology was marked by paths, edges, districts, nodes,
and landmarks. 59 With landmarks, Lynch noted that "[t]here
seemed to be a tendency for those more familiar with a city to rely
increasingly on systems of landmarks for their guides." 6 0 These
landmarks were:
[U]sually a rather simply defined physical object: building,
sign, store, or mountain. . . . These are the innumerable
signs, store fronts, trees, doorknobs, and other urban detail,
which fill in the image of most observers. They are fre-
quently used clues of identity and even of structure, and
seem to be increasingly relied upon as a journey becomes
more and more familiar.' 6'
In other words, landmarks such as signs became more important
to citizens familiar with a locale as a means of creating an identity
of the city, which was increasingly important as cities metasta-
sized into megalopolises in which form was less evident, and there-
fore the ability to read a city became harder.162
Lynch, like Jacobs, realized that historic preservation played a
vital role in fighting the super-block. But both Jacobs and Lynch
feared that historic preservation could reach too far and obstruct
the present use of the city. Lynch noted that the aim of historic
preservation "should be the conservation of present value as well
156. Id. at 372-73.
157. See KEVIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY (1960).
158. See id.
159. Id. at 47-48.
160. Id. at 78.
161. Id. at 48.
162. Id. at 119 ("Large-scale imageable environments are rare today. Yet the spatial
organization of contemporary life, the speed of movement, and the speed and scale of new
construction, all make it possible and necessary to construct such environments by con-
scious design.").
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as the maintenance of a sense of near continuity."16 3 Lynch goes on
to note that "[t]hings are useful to us for their actual current quali-
ties and not for some mystic essence of time gone by"164 and that
"[h]istorical areas are not so much irreplaceable as rarely re-
placed."165 In proposing a method of historic preservation, Lynch
stated:
Public agencies will be more effective in guiding change
than in preventing it. In addition . . . I prefer to emphasize
the creation of a sense of local continuity-the tangible
presentation of historical context, one or two generations
deep, in all our living space-over the saving of special
things. That continuity should extend to the near future as
well as the near and middle-range past. In any changing
area, I propose the retention of some elements, fragments,
or symbols of the immediately previous state. Elements
least likely to interfere with present function would obvi-
ously be chosen, but they should be significant ones, sym-
bolically rich or directly connected with past human behav-
ior or conveying a sense of the total ambience of the past.166
Jacobs and Lynch were concerned that the small-scale city
needed to be preserved, but that did not necessarily entail preser-
vation of the city as it was in any one moment in time. Rather,
both Jacobs and Lynch promoted a view of the city as an evolving
creature that needed to emphasize its present use. At the same
time, Lynch was especially cognizant of the importance of main-
taining a sense of time in the city, and doing so in a manner that
facilitated the image of the city through use of landmarks to help
citizens retain legibility of their space in a megalopolis. Historic
signs, such as the weather vane atop Faneuil Hall or even a bro-
ken street clock, could be valuable'67 as both a defining means of
reference and a connection to the city's history.
The approach of Jacobs and Lynch was later echoed by theo-
rists such as Andreas Huyssen, who stated that:
After the waning of modernist fantasies about creatio ex ni-
hilo and of the desire for the purity of new beginnings, we
have come to read cities and buildings as palimpsests of
163. KEVIN LYNCH, WHAT TIME Is THIS PLACE? 55 (1972).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 57.
166. Id. at 235.
167. Id. at 138 (figures 37-38).
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space, monuments as transformable and transitory, and
sculpture as subject to the vicissitudes of time. Of course,
the majority of buildings are not palimpsests at all. As
Freud once remarked, the same space cannot possibly have
two different contents. But an urban imaginary in its tem-
poral reach may well put different things in one place:
memories of what there was before, imagined alternatives
to what there is. The strong marks of present space merge
in the imaginary with traces of the past, erasures, losses,
and heterotopias.168
As with the sense of time that Lynch sought, retaining the multi-
ple eras of writing upon the palimpsestic city 69 preserves its var-
ied meanings and gives a new depth to the experience of the pre-
sent city. The historic sign contributes not only as a vestige of pre-
vious commerce, but also to the modern experience of history that
grounds an individual in the city. Such an approach would argue
that the government maintains an interest in a public space that
retains a historic context, not only to preserve the past, but for the
present experience of time and memory. While more theoretical
than other, tested purposes, this is arguably more honest in its in-
tent and potentially still within the ambit of Berman.
VI. APPROACHES TO PRESERVING HISTORIC SIGNS WITHIN THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Stacking the variety of public purposes supporting historic
preservation ordinances-either individually or in wholesale fash-
ion-against the Court's compelled speech analysis is unlikely to
yield a dispositive answer as to whether the retention of historic
signs are of a sufficient governmental interest to justify the burden
they impose on current businesses. Post-Berman courts have clear-
ly been lenient in upholding sign regulation and historic preserva-
tion,170 but the limitations of preservation would likely surface
168. ANDREAs HUYSSEN, PRESENT PASTS: URBAN PALIMPSESTS AND THE POLITICS OF
MEMORY 7 (2003).
169. Felix Frankfurter has argued that constitutional analysis itself contains palimp-
sestic qualities. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 48 YALE L.J.
458, 486 (1939) (noting that the commerce clause is a "heavily encrusted palimpsest.").
170. For cases upholding sign regulation, see supra note 41; see also Metro Lights,
L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2009) (cert den'd, 130 S.Ct. 1014);
World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 606 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2010). Facial challeng-
es to historic preservation ordinances are increasingly rare, but see Kruse v. Town of Castle
Rock, 192 P.3d 591 (Colo. 2008) (upholding historic preservation ordinance against facial
and as-applied constitutional challenges). For a rare contemporary case finding a historic
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where, as with historic signs, the issue of how such purposes align
against compelled speech analysis is one of first impression for the
courts.
In such a case, the Court would likely consider the fact-specific
sign preservation scheme at issue, rather than weigh the issues in
the abstract. A schematic analysis of the issues is possible by re-
considering the four methods of preserving historic signs in Preser-
vation Brief 25, as outlined previously, 171 in light of the public pur-
poses of historic preservation and commercial speech interests.
A. Historic Signs Retained
Preservation Brief 25 presents two approaches for retaining a
historic sign on the exterior of the building: retaining the historic
sign unaltered, or modifying the historic sign for use with the new
business. 172 In evaluating such a scheme, analysis must begin with
two questions arising from PG&E: whether the historic sign's
preservation is a question of "extra space" as analyzed in that case
and whether preserving the historic sign is tantamount to the
State compelling the current business owner to advance views with
which the business owner disagrees.173
PG&E's discussion of "billboards" and "sides of buildings" is
dicta, as the only issue before the Court was the use of the rate-
payers' envelope. Nonetheless, the Court indicated its concern
that, had it allowed the utility's adversaries to use the extra space
in the envelope,174 the concept of "extra space" could be used more
broadly to justify any variety of compelled speech. 75 If the "side of
[the] building[]" is a permissible measuring stick, as PG&E indi-
cates,176 then the mere fact that a property owner's signage for the
current use can be accommodated and that the historic sign can
also be accommodated in the extra space of the building's side is
not enough. PG&E provides that such arguments of incidental ac-
commodation are not persuasive in situations where the message
that is being required advances a view with which the business
owner would disagree. 77
That begs the second question of PG&E: whether a historic
sign could ever be held to advance views with which the business
preservation ordinance facially unconstitutional, see Hanna v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App.
3d 909 (2009).
171. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
172. See AUER, supra note 8.
173. See Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
174. See id. at 1, 19 n.15.





disagrees. 178 As Preservation Brief 25 argues, "[s]urviving historic
signs have not lost their ability to speak. But their message has
changed." 179 The preservation argument is that the historic sign is
evocative of the past only, as its original communicative function
has ceased and the passerby recognizes that the sign no longer
proposes a transaction or otherwise intends to communicate its
message. Skepticism of such an approach on a broad scale is war-
ranted, in part because business signage has not changed uniform-
ly over time. Many businesses still use historic signage to actively
brand their products, as is especially true of products for which
nostalgia is part of the brand, such as Coca-Cola. As a result, con-
sumers viewing a faded Coca-Cola sign against a brick building do
not assume that the sign no longer proposes a transaction simply
because it is old. In other words, for some historic signs the mean-
ing does not change whatsoever, especially where the branding it-
self has incorporated a sense of the passage of time.
Of more direct concern is the required maintenance of historic
signage that constitutes a political or ideological viewpoint. For
instance, the preservation of segregation signage by a private
property owner, such as "white" and "colored" bathroom signs, 180
would likely be considered compelled speech, as it associates the
business with a racial ideology in a manner not easily discernible
from intended racism. In such cases it is not clear that the mean-
ing has changed at all. While preservation of such signage may
have the benefit of helping to remind Americans of a difficult and
troubling part of their history, requiring preservation of such signs
by private businesses would likely be deemed unconstitutionally
compelled speech.
More difficult questions arise when examples such as the baby
clothier below a historic business sign reading "liquor and ciga-
rettes," or the used-car dealer beneath a historic business sign ad-
vertising "Johnie's Broiler: Family Restaurant, Coffee Shop"181 are
considered. The compelled-speech doctrine case law, such as Zau-
derer, has thus far focused on the question of whether the govern-
ment may require truthful and factual information to be provided
by the advertiser, such as warnings on attorney advertisements. 182
However, the Court has not addressed the question of whether the
government may require non-truthful and non-factual information
to be retained by a business owner where the purposes, even those
178. See id. at 19.
179. AUER, supra note 8 (conclusion).
180. See Weyeneth, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
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of historic preservation articulated in the ways outlined above, re-
main far more diffuse than the interests of the business owner. In
such cases, the retained words, however stylized, indicate particu-
lar types of transactions that are still common today. A passerby
still expects to encounter stores selling liquor, cigarettes, and cof-
fee. Furthermore, signs for such products are often highly stylized,
both in their historic and present forms, and a consumer does not
immediately recognize that such transactions are no longer possi-
ble where he or she sees a historic sign advertising such a vacated
use. More importantly to the current business, the passerby does
not immediately recognize that the products for sale are baby
clothes or used cars. Therefore, the current business owners may
object to the confusing language of such historic signs, even if such
historic signs could otherwise be accommodated in the "extra
space" of the building's side.
If preserving a historic sign were not compelled speech per se
and therefore must be removed, policy should trend towards ensur-
ing that the business owner's signage is the primary business ac-
tivity communicated and proposed, and the historic sign speaks in
a manner that does not propose a business transaction. This can be
achieved in a number of ways, some of which are outlined in
Preservation Brief 25.183 One common approach is to replace letter-
ing on a historic sign to indicate the new business, such as replac-
ing "coffee shop" with "used cars," or "liquor and cigarettes" with
"baby clothes."18 4 A number of solutions are likely possible depend-
ing on the facts of the signage.
This approach would likely satisfy a number of the purposes
espoused by historic preservation. By retaining the historic sign in
a manner that prioritizes the present business signage, preserva-
tion avoids the trap of "city taxidermy" that worried Jacobs.185 It
also preserves the landmark quality of the historic sign as a navi-
gational device in the city's typology, as Lynch noted,186 while also
prioritizing the present use on which Lynch insisted. 87 A hard-line
approach, such as that of Sax, would likely be unsatisfied, howev-
er, arguing instead that change to the historic sign is the equiva-
lent of painting over a corner of a masterpiece (presume, for argu-
ment, Picasso's Les Demoiselles d'Avignon) to give a child space to
draw.188 Similarly, those that encourage preservation for its tourist
183. See AUER, supra note 8.
184. See id.
185. See Jacobs, supra notes 154-156.
186. See Lynch, supra notes 157-162.
187. See id.
188. See Sax, supra note 139.
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draw may be equally disconcerted by prioritizing the present use
where the historic sign contributes to the atmosphere that is the
purpose of tourism. And yet, Lynch's proposal of prioritizing pre-
sent use of signage while preserving elements of the sign that are
symbols of the past seems very much in line with the Court's prior-
ities of encouraging businesses to put forth truthful, factual infor-
mation while requiring the state to avoid compelling businesses to
advance ideas with which they disagree. Lynch's proposal is noth-
ing more than a typology of true and factual commercial speech
permitting a city to function in its present state, all-the-while re-
sisting the forces of nostalgia and recreated pasts-those aspects of
preservation that lean indelibly toward compelled speech.
There is a complicating factor, however. While such modifica-
tions to the historic sign may meet many of the purposes of historic
preservation broadly conceived, modification of the sign could very
easily prevent a sign from ever becoming designated a historic re-
source. 89 To become listed as a historic resource on the National
Register, a sign must possess both significance and integrity, as
with any other building or landmark. 90 However, changing the
lettering on a historic sign may be deemed to weaken that sign's
integrity of materials and, unless done very carefully, could also
have the potential to compromise the sign's integrity of design,
workmanship, feeling, and association.' 9' That represents five of
the seven components of integrity,192 and thus a sign with changed
lettering may be deemed to be too compromised to be a historic re-
source and thus ineligible for listing on the National Register. As a
result, a legal consideration of a modified historic sign under the
First Amendment would still face the issue of whether to prioritize
commercial speech, historic preservation's purposes, or the tech-
nical dictates of the NHPA.
B. Historic Signs Removed
Two other options are presented by Preservation Brief 25: re-
moval of the sign from the site to donate it to a museum or preser-
vation group, or relocation of the sign to the interior of the build-
ing, such as in the lobby or above the bar in a restaurant.93 Such
removal eliminates the compelled-speech dilemma-the historic
sign is gone and speaks to the passerby no more. As indicated pre-
189. See How To APPLY THE NATIONAL REGISTER CRITERIA, supra note 146, at 44-49.
190. Id. at 44.
191. See id. at 44-49.
192. See id.
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viously, a solution shy of removal is most likely available to satisfy
the strictures of compelled speech. On the other hand, complete
removal, even if to a museum or inside, does not meet many
preservation goals.
The preservation of the historic sign in an off-site location
could arguably meet the purpose of preserving the masterwork as
Sax argued, but in a manner that seems to substitute form for sub-
stance. The masterwork quality of the historic sign is, in part, its
reference to the cityscape in which it was placed. Community his-
tory proponents may argue that removal eliminates the very pur-
pose of preserving the sign-its civic prominence. Lynch would ar-
gue that the sign's complete loss eliminates a typological landmark
and makes the city less legible to its citizens, and those prioritizing
tourism would emphasize the loss of an element in the city that
makes it attractive to visitors. In short, removal to a museum or to
the interior of the building would satisfy few, if any, of the preser-
vationists' purposes. In addition, historic preservationists would
likely be unsatisfied with such an approach because it would com-
promise the sign's integrity of feeling and association, and thus
would limit the sign's ability to be listed as a historic resource on
the National Register.194
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the only approach that is not satisfied with any of the
approaches in Preservation Brief 25195 is that of Strahilevitz, who
emphasizes the "right to destroy" property.196 Strahilevitz's cri-
tique is important, as it illustrates the slow evolution from the un-
bridled ability to destroy buildings to a situation in which not only
buildings, but also ephemera such as signage are the subject of
government regulation.197 Nonetheless, given the prominence of
preservation in the public imagination, not to mention the broad
police powers justifications put forth in Berman,s98 such unbridled
right of destruction is unlikely to return any time soon. Rather,
preservation is more likely to be reigned in as it encroaches on
other rights, as has happened in recent years, where religious
groups have asserted their right of religious freedom when battling
preservationists in their efforts to destroy buildings they own.199
193. See AUER, supra note 8, at 52-63.
194. See HOW To APPLY THE NATIONAL REGISTER CRITERIA, supra note 146, at 44-49.
195. See AUER, supra note 8.
196. See Strahilevitz, supra note 141.
197. See id.
198. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
199. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see generally Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 to 2000cc-5
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By considering historic signs in light of other rights, such as
freedom of speech, the limits of preservation emerge in high relief.
It becomes evident that even within the historic preservation
movement, the question of what should be preserved remains
open. However, that question is increasingly viewed as one more
appropriate for public comment and public discourse. As the
movement takes on a more egalitarian and democratic march, so
too do its provisions reach deeper into the fabric of present-day life.
The natural result of this growth will be that preservation will, in
turn, bump up against other rights and freedoms held close.
Whether that is freedom of speech in the commercial context, or
some other right, preservation's battles in its era of democratiza-
tion will not be only over its direction, but how it aligns with other,
equally-valued institutions of freedom and expression.
(2000); see also CAL. GOVT CODE § 25373(d) (preventing local landmarking of churches
without their consent); Andie Ross, Historic Preservation: First Amendment Considerations
(2005) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author) (review-
ing historic preservation cases involving religious institutions).
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